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Abstract
The adult sex ratio (ASR) is defined as the number of fertile males divided by the number
of fertile females in a population. We build an ODE model with minimal age structure, in
which males compete for paternities using either a multiple-mating or searching-then-guarding
strategy, to investigate the value of ASR as an index for predicting which strategy males
will adopt, with a focus in our investigation on the differences of strategy choice between
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human hunter-gatherers (Homo sapiens). Parameters in the
model characterise aspects of life history and behaviour, and determine both dominant strategy
and the ASR when the population is at or near equilibrium. Sensitivity analysis on the model
parameters informs us that ASR is strongly influenced by parameters characterising life history,
while dominant strategy is affected most strongly by the effectiveness of guarding (average
length of time a guarded pair persists, and resistance to paternity theft) and moderately by
some life history traits. For fixed effectiveness of guarding and other parameters, dominant
strategy tends to change from multiple mating to guarding along a curve that aligns well with
a contour of constant ASR, under variation of parameters such as longevity and age female
fertility ends. This confirms the hypothesis that ASR may be a useful index for predicting the
optimal male mating strategy, provided we have some limited information about ecology and
behaviour.
1. Introduction
The closest living genus to our human genus, Homo, is genus Pan; and we share many physio-
logical, developmental and behavioural traits with them. Significant differences exist, however,
particularly regarding life history and the social structure around mating arrangements. While
both humans and chimpanzees engage in a variety of strategies, such as multiple mating, pos-
sessive short-term, or longer-lasting exclusive relationships (see, for example, (Tutin, 1979)),
each species tends to engage in one class of strategies with greater frequency than the others.
Some recent studies examine the evolution of monogamy from a mathematical perspective; for
example, (Loo et al., 2017a,b; Schacht and Bell, 2016; Schacht et al., 2017) all discuss the role of
mating sex ratio and partner availability in the evolution of monogamy or other mating-related
behaviour. In our study, we broadly categorise the reproductive strategies as either multiple
mating or mate guarding, in order to build a relatively simple model that captures sufficient
dynamics to explore the problem of predicting strategy by observing demography. Specifically,
chimpanzees (with relatively more females per male) typically engage in multiple mating more
frequently than guarding, and hunter-gatherers (with relatively scarce fertile females) tend to
engage in guarding more frequently than multiple mating.
Life tables indicate that roughly half of infants in wild chimpanzee and hunter-gatherer groups
will die before reaching maturity (sexual maturity). On reaching maturity, though, chimpanzees
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and humans take divergent paths: a chimpanzee just at maturity (first birth around age 14)
may expect to live another fifteen to twenty years (Hill et al., 2001), but a human hunter-
gatherer at the same point (first birth around age 19) may expect to live healthily for another
forty years or more (Blurton Jones, 2016; Hill and Hurtado, 1995; Howell, 1979). The age of last
birth occurs in both humans and chimps at around 45 years, and almost no wild chimpanzee
can expect to survive until this age; those who do, though robust enough to have reached that
age, are by that time relatively frail. In stark contrast, many hunter-gatherer females live in
good health beyond menopause, only becoming frail into their seventies; those who survive so
long have spent half their adult lives post-fertile.
Though pair bonding is not unknown amongst the primates, humans are unique among great
apes in that we tend to form relatively long-lasting pair bonds, as opposed to multiple mating,
wherein no long-term attachments are made. A favoured hypothesis to explain our different
behaviour is that it arises from paternal investment (Washburn and Lancaster, 1968; Lancaster
and Lancaster, 1983)—the hypothesis that care provided by males (ostensibly in the form
of meat acquired through their hunting) to their offspring is the basis for the formation of
cooperative pair bonds between men and women to help raise their young—but more recent
work suggests that other mechanisms may be responsible for this difference in behaviour from
our relatives (see, for example, (Gurven and Hill, 2009; Hawkes et al., 2010; Loo et al., 2017a,b;
Lukas and Clutton-Brock, 2013)). The extension of the human life span (and of the male
fertility period) without lengthening female fertility to later ages directly changes the ratio of
fertile males to fertile females (called the adult sex ratio: ASR). As the ASR increases, the
number of fertile females available per male decreases, which we argue changes the incentives
for adopting either strategy.
Female choice arises as an important question in mating dynamics, and incorporating that
dynamic in game-theoretical models of mating strategy selection can significantly change the
outcome of such a model, as discussed in, for example, (Parker and Birkhead, 2013; Clutton-
Brock and Parker, 1995; Opie et al., 2013). As the focus of our study is the chimpanzee-human
relationship, we make the explicit decision to disregard female choice, for the following reasons.
Chimpanzee males tend to coerce—often violently—fertile females to have sex, potentially
resulting in multiple partners for females (Muller et al., 2007). Furthermore, in many primates
the risk of infanticide by males is very high (Van Schaik and Janson, 2000) (including among
chimpanzees: see (Arcadi and Wrangham, 1999) and references therein), leading to varied
strategies, including female promiscuity to confuse paternity (Muller et al., 2007); consequently,
females chimpanzees are not especially choosy. In humans, even, choosiness among females is
not necessarily optimal for the survival of their offspring, as discussed in (Hrdy, 2003), for
instance, leading to polyandrous mating.
2. Methods
In this paper, we construct a simple two-strategy ODE model, in which males either guard
mates (once acquired) or multiply mate (that is, possibly acquiring many mates at the same
time), and competition between strategies occurs only through the acquisition of paternities.
This approach is similar to the dynamic analysis assessed in (Mylius, 1999), which explicitly
models pair formation. Our approach, like the work of (Krˇivan and Cressman, 2017; Krˇivan
et al., 2018), explicitly acknowledges finite (and differing) interaction times affecting the payoff
(in the form of paternities) for the different strategies, without the use of traditional game-
theoretical payoff matrices.
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Offspring are assumed to inherit the strategies of their fathers. Guarding males do not con-
tribute to the survival of their offspring, and females do not express preference for either type
of male. Our model has a number of parameters, which correspond to aspects of life history,
ecology, and behaviour. We will vary the parameters and record the resulting dominant male
strategy and the resulting ASR, with the intent to determine whether, or under what circum-
stances, the ASR can serve as an index for determining what strategy males are most likely to
employ.
Inheritance of strategy by paternal descent is assumed as a method of simplification. It is of
course very likely that multiple factors contribute to the strategy that a male may choose, and
that the strategy an individual carries may be “mixed” (in the sense that he commits some
fraction of his efforts to one strategy at the expense of full efficiency in the other), and in reality
an individual may conceivably change his strategy investment over the course of his own life.
Our simplification ensures that the representation of each strategy across a population is in
proportion from one generation to the next.
2.1. Life cycle
Consider a population P comprising
1. fertile searching males G, who guard their mates once paired,
2. fertile multiple-mating males M , who return to the mating pool as soon as they have
mated,
3. fertile receptive females F , who may be “recruited” by a G or M male and may or may
not have been previously recruited,
4. fertile unreceptive females FM , who have been recruited by a multiple-mating male and
are thus occupied short term by that male, or pregnant or lactating as a consequence,
5. guarded pairs FG, consisting of one fertile guarding male whose energy goes into (possibly
imperfectly) guarding his mate from multiple maters and one fertile female who may bear
offspring to multiple maters who steal paternities from her partner,
6. offspring of guarding males CG (called “guarded offspring”), and
7. offspring of multiple-mating males CM (called “unguarded offspring”, though may be
born to guarded females),
summarised in Table 1. The total population is P = F + G + M + 2FG + FM + CG + CM ,
where the number of guarded pairs FG is counted twice because each guarded pair contains two
individuals. Parameters of the model are summarised in Table 2, and its dynamics illustrated
in Figure 1, and all are described below.
Juveniles are assumed to mature at rate γ per individual, and die at rate δ per individual
(assumed independent of population density). Half the juveniles who survive to maturity
we assume1 become receptive females, while the other half become either multiple maters or
searchers (respectively the same as their fathers). Observe that paternal investment is not
modelled here. Unguarded offspring do not receive less care than guarded offspring, and no
distinction is made among the survival of juveniles depending on their paternity.
1Although there is variability of birth sex ratios among primates in general—in some instances quite far from
0.5—it remains that in the majority of cases the ratio is close to 0.5. A table of birth sex ratios for 102 species
is given in (Silk and Brown, 2008; supplemental material), for instance, of which 42 also include wild data.
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Figure 1: Illustration of our model, excluding removal due to death (adults at rate µ per head, young at rate δ
per head) or retirement (adults only at rates τ for females and λ for males). Units of FG are pairs of individuals;
if either partner dies or retires the remaining partner returns to the original group. Multiple-mating males will
mate with receptive females and return immediately to search for another receptive female. Some offspring of
guarded pairs have multiple-mating fathers due to paternity theft.
Fertile females include receptive and unreceptive females, and female members of guarded pairs.
They die at base rate µ (assumed to be independent of population density) and advance to
menopause at rate τ . Post-fertile females “retire” from the population as they reach menopause,
as they no longer play a role in the reproductive dynamics in this model. We do not explicitly
model grandmother effects, such as extra calorific benefits due to the presence of post-fertile
females who can provision the offspring of other females (see, for instance, Coxworth et al.
(2015); Loo et al. (2017b) for connections between grandmothering and sex-ratio, and Kim
et al. (2012, 2014, 2019) for modelling of the relationship between grandmothering and human
life history). Fertile males include searching males, multiple-mating males and the male partners
in guarded pairs. Fertile males have a base death rate of kµ, and retire due to geriatric infirmity
at rate λ, whereupon they too leave the population.
Receptive females are “recruited” by either searching or multiple-mating males at rate r per
possible pair. If recruited by a searching male, they together form a guarded pair, which will
on average break spontaneously with rate β per pair, with both partners returning to their
respective original pools. Guarded pairs may also be broken by the death or retirement of one
partner, in which case the remaining partner returns to his or her own original pool. Females
recruited by multiple-mating males become unreceptive for a period of time, returning to the
receptive pool with average rate σ. Females in guarded pairs and unreceptive females produce
offspring (respectively guarded and unguarded offspring) at rate ρ per bonded/unreceptive
female, which includes time spent pregnant or lactating. We can think of 1
ρ
as the inter-birth
interval. Note that in our model females in the FG and FM pools are producing offspring (as
Table 1: List and descriptions of all variables. These variables represent number, rather than proportion of
population.
Variable Description
P Total population
F Receptive females
G Searching (guarding) males
M Multiple-mating males
FG Guarded pairs
FM Unreceptive females
CG Guarded offspring
CM Unguarded offspring
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F +G FG FG + CG
FG + CM
r
β
ρ
(
1− gM
M+FG
)
ρgM
M+FG
F +M FM +M F +M + CM
r
σ
ρ
Figure 2: Illustration of paternity theft dynamics. Receptive females F may pair with either guarding G or
multiple-mating M males; females who have mated with a male of either type produce offspring at rate ρ, but
a proportion of pair-bonded females produce offspring fathered by multiple maters.
opposed to necessarily having current dependents), and even if they retire or die, we assume
that any juveniles already born are cared for until maturity or death. That is, our model
assumes that all care required by a juvenile is provided, no matter how much or how little that
is.
Once a searching guarder has recruited a receptive female, he stops searching and invests his
energy in guarding, so as to be assured of the paternity of the offspring his mate produces, and
stops seeking other mates. Multiple-mating males, however, return immediately to the same
pool to search for other mates. The kinetics of this mating model are as follows:
F +G
r−−−−−⇀↽ −
β
FG
ρ−−−−−→ FG + CG,
F +M
r−−−−−⇀↽ −
σ
FM +M
ρ−−−−−→ F +M + CM .
However, multiple maters may attempt to steal paternities from males in guarded pairs, and
succeed at rate g with respect to the density of multiple maters, illustrated in Figure 2. Pa-
ternity theft is taken to be in proportion to M/(M + FG), the density of multiple-mating
males amongst all males who are considered to be in line for paternity, thus representing a
frequency-dependent interaction rate. Searching G males are excluded from the density ex-
pression because although they are searching for mates, if they obtain mates from the pool
of receptive females F they enter the pool FG of guarded pairs, but if they were to steal a
paternity from males already in guarded pairs, according to our strategy inheritance model the
resulting offspring will still be guarded CG, the male fraction of whom will mature into the
pool of searching guarding males G; hence paternity theft by guarders is not considered.
Together, β and g constitute an “effectiveness of guarding”: β relates to the ability of guarding
males to retain their mates for extended periods of time, and g relates to their ability to ensure
that the offspring born to their female partners are indeed their own.
Finally, we include a population-density-dependent death rate νP , so that population growth is
constrained. Removal due to the population density dependence does not have to be considered
as death, but could also represent migration away from the population of interest. At this point,
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we can write the equations. A dot denotes a time derivative.
F˙ =
1
2
γ
(
CG + CM
)
+ (β + λ+ µ (k + νP ))FG + σFM − (r (G+M) + τ + µ (1 + νP ))F,
G˙ =
1
2
γCG + (β + τ + µ (1 + νP ))FG − (rF + λ+ µ (k + νP ))G,
M˙ =
1
2
γCM − (λ+ µ (k + νP ))M,
F˙G = rFG− (β + τ + λ+ µ (1 + k + 2νP ))FG,
F˙M = rFM − (σ + τ + µ (1 + νP ))FM ,
C˙G = ρ
(
1− g M
M + FG
)
FG − (γ + δ (1 + νP ))CG,
C˙M = ρ
(
FM + g
MFG
M + FG
)
− (γ + δ (1 + νP ))CM .
(1)
In words, this is
F˙ =
[
rate female
juveniles mature
]
+
 rate guarded pairsbreak spontaneously or
by death or retirement
+ [rate unreceptive
females return
]
−
 rate receptivefemales recruited
by males
+
 rate receptivefemales retire
or die
 ,
G˙ =
[
rate guarded male
offspring mature
]
+
 rate guarded pairsbreak spontaneously or
by death or retirement
−
[rate guarded
pairs form
]
+
rate guardingmales retire
or die
 ,
M˙ =
[
rate unguarded male
offspring mature
]
−
rate multiple-maters retire
or die
,
F˙G =
[
rate guarded
pairs form
]
−
[
rate guarded
pairs break
]
,
F˙M =
 rate receptivefemales recruited
by multiple maters
−
rate unreceptivefemales return,
retire or die
,
C˙G =
[
rate guarded
offspring are born
]
−
[
rate guarded
offspring mature or die
]
,
C˙M =
 rate unguardedoffspring are born,
including paternity theft
− [ rate unguarded
offspring mature or die
]
.
Offspring of multiple maters born to guarded females are automatically classified as unguarded
(due to the terms ±gMFG/(M + FG) in the last two lines of Equation (1) above, indicating
paternity theft), because strategies are assumed for simplicity to be inherited patrilineally. This
means a reduction in the rate at which guarded offspring are born and a corresponding increase
in the rate at which unguarded offspring are born when both g and M are not zero.
2.2. Life history model
Our principal interest is in understanding the relative success of alternative strategies depend-
ing on fertility and mortality parameters, and guarding effectiveness. Mortality rates at all
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δ µ
Figure 3: Block diagram of the age structure model governed by Equations (2), with juveniles denoted by
C and adults by A. Juvenile death rate, adult death rate and maturation rate are represented by δ, µ and γ
respectively.
ages determine the average longevities, but we are interested in what strategy (or balance of
strategies) might be chosen by populations with given longevities. Dividing the population into
fertile adults and juveniles imposes a minimal age structure, which we can conveniently use
to reframe the parameters. We wish to exchange µ, δ and γ for parameters that characterise
certain aspects of life history and environment.
Our model takes advantage of the elegance and simplicity of ODEs to achieve its goals. As such,
it is not the same as an age-structured PDE model, although it contains a basic age structure
which we shall use. We have two compartments representing juveniles and five compartments
representing adults. Individuals begin in a juvenile compartment and move to an adult com-
partment at some time in the interval (0,∞) to take part in the adult dynamics that are of
interest. As a result, some individuals can transition into maturity at arbitrarily low age, and
some individuals can remain juvenile for an arbitrarily long time; in a certain sense, an ODE
system such as this can only speak in terms of probabilities and of average times. Later work
may introduce explicit age structure in an attempt to build in more realism.
If we consider only females and combine all female juveniles and all female adults into re-
spective groups C and A, and consider only the dynamics of maturation (due to γ) and the
linear death rates δ and µ independent of population density (otherwise due to ν), we can
extract dynamics that represent, in some sense, the female survivorship and the demographic
distribution (between juveniles and adults) of the female population of age t. This maturation
and death dynamic is illustrated in Figure 3, where the transition from C to A is governed by
a intensity γ, rather than a strict time (as in a model with more detailed ageing dynamics).
These dynamics will be governed by differential equations
dC
dt
= −(δ + γ)C,
dA
dt
= γC − µA,
(2)
and we will take initial conditions C(0) = 1 and A(0) = 0. The solution of equations (2)
is easily obtained by standard techniques (e.g. elimination of one variable and the use of an
integrating factor), yielding two exponentially decreasing functions, for positive δ, γ and µ.
Because we take the initial conditions of Equations (2) such that C(0) + A(0) = 1, the sum
S(t) := C(t) + A(t) represents the probability of an individual surviving to age t, depicted in
Figure 4 as the solid curve. Note that S(t) is a strictly decreasing function for t ≥ 0, whose
limit is 0 as t → ∞. The ratio A(t)
S(t)
is the probability that a surviving individual has matured
by age t; it is a simple exercise to check that this expression has a limiting value of 1 as t→∞
when δ+γ > µ,2 and by construction the mean transition time to maturity is 1
γ
. Also depicted
2The case where δ + γ < µ is not of interest to our particular study, as adult mortality is generally lower
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t0 L
s0
1
A(t)
S(t)
C(t)
Age t
Figure 4: A typical example of S(t) (solid curve) governed by the dynamics of equations (2). The dotted curve
shows A(t), indicating the demographic breakdown of individuals of age t, split between juveniles and adults.
The grey shaded region indicates juveniles: initially all individuals are juveniles, who decrease in proportion of
surviving population exponentially as age t → ∞ according to exp(−(δ + γ)t) (through either transition into
maturity or death). At age t0 = L/2 we have proportion s0 = S(t0) of initial population surviving.
in Figure 4 is A(t) (dotted curve) and a representation of C(t) as the vertical distance between
the solid and dotted curves.
The expected time an individual lives in the population is
L =
∫ ∞
0
S(t) dt =
γ + µ
µ (δ + γ)
.
We impose the constraints γ = 2/L = 1/t0, where t0 is the mean time to reproductive maturity,
and S(t0) = s0 (the proportion surviving at the mean transition time to maturity). The purpose
of these constraints is to introduce parameters characterising certain aspects of the population:
s0 characterises something of the “toughness” of being a juvenile; and L characterises the
average life span of an individual.
Our constraints and the definition of L give us a system of equations
s0 = S(t0),
L =
γ + µ
µ (δ + γ)
,
(3)
from which we can numerically obtain values of δ and µ, given an expected life span L and
survival rate into maturity s0.
As adult males are subject to base mortality rate kµ, they suffer life expectancy at birth
L˜ = γ+kµ
kµ(δ+γ)
. Their relative life expectancy at birth is L˜
L
= γ+kµ
k(γ+µ)
.
Adult females have a fertile window of t1− t0; we can thus set τ(L, t1) = 22t1−L . Similarly, males
have an fertile window of t2 − t0; and so we set λ(L, t2) = 22t2−L . For our purposes, we choose
t1 = 45 for the age of female fertility ends, and t2 = 75 for the age of male retirement. While
male chimpanzees cannot expect to live until such ages, such a high retirement age ensures that
most low-longevity males will be removed by death, rather than retirement. In reality, it is
likely that the age of male retirement is coupled somehow to longevity (as would be the age of
than juvenile mortality, but in that case the limiting ratio of adults over adults and juveniles is γµ−δ .
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female retirement/menopause in all primates but humans), but for the purposes of exploration
in this model we keep these parameters decoupled.
The original parameters involved in life history (γ, δ, µ, τ , λ) may now be replaced by expres-
sions involving (L, s0, t1, t2). Although k affects the life span of males, we place it among the
parameters we consider to represent behavioural aspects of the biology, (r, g, β, σ, k). The
remaining two parameters, (ρ, ν) we consider ecological/biological not related directly to life
history or behaviour (as far as this study goes). Table 2 lists and describes all parameters and
typical values or ranges that we explore, and Table 3 lists the mortality and other life history
functions.
For Table 2 we draw on (Blurton Jones, 1986, 2016; Emery Thompson et al., 2007; Gurven and
Kaplan, 2007; Hawkes and Blurton Jones, 2005; Hill et al., 2001; Nishida et al., 2003) for life
history data, which guides our choices for life history parameter values and ranges to explore.
A noted shortcoming of our model is that realistic birth rates (denoted by ρ) tend to be slightly
below replacement value; rather than compensate by increasing the mean window of female
fertility (by decreasing either or both of the death and female retirement rates), we increase
the birth rate to prevent extinction. Other parameters, such as population density-dependent
death rate ν, couple-forming rate r, paternity theft success rate g, pair-bond break-up rate β,
and return rate σ are guessed as being reasonable to explore. For instance, pair-bond stability
is determined by β; human pair-bond length, for instance, is famously variable and as a topic
consumes a large amount of glossy paper every year even for modern humans, yet established
pairs sometimes last until both partners are senescent. Male-specific mortality in adulthood
is typically higher, on average, than female (see, for example, (Courtenay and Santow, 1989)
for chimpanzees, or (Hill et al., 2007) for hunter-gatherers), though we choose to additionally
explore a region where male-specific mortality is lower.
Parameters can be grouped according to three broad themes: life history, (L, s0, t1, t2); be-
haviour, (r, g, β, σ, k); and environment/biology, (ρ, ν).
2.3. Adult sex ratio (ASR)
The adult sex ratio (ASR) is defined as the ratio of fertile males to fertile females. Our model
assumes all adult males are fertile. Thus the ASR a is given by
a =
M¯
F¯
,
where M¯ = M +G+FG is the total number of fertile males, and F¯ = F +FG+FM is the total
number of fertile females. The hypothesis of (Coxworth et al., 2015) regarding humans, also
the subject of (Loo et al., 2017a,b; Schacht and Bell, 2016) is that the ASR determines male
mating strategy. We aim to investigate whether the ASR is a sufficient index to determine the
strategy (when there are two strategies in play) or if other parameters are necessary.
The model dynamics cause us to predict that increasing t1 will decrease the ASR by causing
females to remain fertile for longer, and thus increase relative to the number of fertile males.
Similarly, increasing t2 will increase the ASR by increasing the relative number of fertile males
to fertile females. Increasing time that individuals are in the population L (independently of
t1 and t2) should increase the effect of disparity between t1 and t2, so with t2 > t1, higher
L should increase the ASR. This is a consequence of the model; for if t2  t1  t∗, then
1
t2−t∗  1t1−t∗ , and this may in turn be much smaller than µ or kµ. This higher value of µ or kµ
removing individuals by death would effectively swamp the effect of removal due to retirement.
For given time L that individuals are in the population, increasing s0 ∈ [13 , 23 ] increases µ and
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Table 2: List and descriptions of all parameters. Some parameters are chosen zero during initial analysis.
Values and ranges for these parameters are chosen for relevance to understanding differences between hunter-
gatherer and chimpanzee male mating strategies.
Parameter Typical value/range Description Reference
L 10 to 50 Mean female longevity (Gurven and Kaplan, 2007;
Hawkes and Blurton Jones,
2005; Hill et al., 2001)
s0
1
3 to
2
3 Proportion of juveniles surviving (Gurven and Kaplan, 2007;
Hill et al., 2001)
t1 30 to 60 Age female fertility ends (Emery Thompson et al.,
2007; Hawkes and Blur-
ton Jones, 2005; Nishida
et al., 2003)
t2 60 to 80 Age of male retirement (Gurven and Kaplan, 2007;
Hawkes and Blurton Jones,
2005; Hill et al., 2001)
ρ 14 to
1
2 Rate juveniles are born (Blurton Jones, 1986, 2016;
Nishida et al., 2003)
ν 11500 to
1
500 Crowding factor
r 12 to 2 Couple-forming rate
g 0 to 0.225 Paternity theft success rate
β 0 to 14 Break-up rate for guarded pairs
σ 12 to 2 Return rate for F
M females
k 0.9 to 1.1 Male death rate modifier (Hill et al., 2001)
τ see Table 3 Rate of menopausal retirement
λ see Table 3 Male retirement rate
Table 3: Life history functions.
Parameter Functional form Description
t0(L) L/2 Half mean life span
γ(L) 2/L Maturation rate of juveniles into adults
δ(L, s0) Determined numerically from (3) Base juvenile death rate
µ(L, s0) Determined numerically from (3) Base death rate of adults
τ(L, t1)
1
t1−t∗(L) Transition rate of fertile females to post-fertile
λ(L, t2)
1
t2−t∗(L) Transition rate of fertile males to infertile
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thus should tend the ASR towards 1. Naturally, increasing k should decrease the ASR by
selectively removing males earlier.
2.4. Numerical methods
We explore our model in two ways, both using Matlab’s ode15s function to integrate sys-
tem (1) numerically, ensuring that all variables remain non-negative. The first exploration is to
straightforwardly study the parameter landscape on grids varying two life history parameters
(L and t1), with other parameters fixed at various choices. The second is a broader sensitivity
analysis varying all parameters (as well as initial condition) within reasonable ranges, allowing
us to assess how each parameter influences ASR and dominant strategy.
3. Results
We generate a grid on the parameter space and examine the resulting ASR and strategy contours
in the plane whose axes are L and t1 (the Lt1-plane), illustrated in Figures 5-8. We show
several slices of the grid for different paternity theft and pair-bond break-up rates (assessing
the behaviour with regard to effectiveness of guarding). The four figures show the results for
all combinations of t2 ∈ {60, 80} and k ∈ {1, 1.2}. Each figure shows a grid of six contour
plots (landscapes) for paternity theft rate g = 0 or 0.003, and pair-bond break-up rates β = 0,
1
16
, and 1
4
. Initial conditions for Figures 5-8 had G(0) = 250 adult searching guarding males,
M(0) = 250 adult multiple-mating males, F (0) = 500 receptive adult females, FG(0) = 0
guarded females, FM(0) = 0 unreceptive females, CG(0) = 500(1 − g) guarded juveniles,
and CM(0) = 500(1 + g) unguarded juveniles (accounting for paternity theft in the juvenile
population). Further simulations were done with variations in the initial male population
structure, to assess whether or not initial conditions could influence the equilibrium. This is
discussed in subsection 3.2.
Each landscape has an “extinction boundary” along the bottom and left of the image, where
either menopause or death occurs at such a low average age that the average number of offspring
per female is below replacement levels with the given mean birth rate ρ = 1
3
. In general, there
is a clear boundary between regions of the Lt1 plane where one strategy becomes completely
prevalent and the other is suppressed; except near the extinction boundary to the lower left in
some of the landscapes, this boundary has a positive gradient.
Contours of constant ASR are generally of positive gradient also. This observation is to be
expected, as with increasing age female fertility ends t1, the number of fertile females relative
to fertile males increases; and as life expectancy at birth increases, the adult death rate µ
decreases, causing females and male retirement rates τ and λ to dominate in the removal of
fertile adults from the population, increasing the ASR when t1 < t2. Rephrasing the preceding
logic, high adult mortality swamps removal by retirement; conversely, low adult mortality makes
visible any differences between t1 and t2. In these plots, we do not have t1 > t2, so only positive-
gradient contours are visible; had we explored either lower t2 or higher t1, negative-gradient
contours would appear.
There is a tipping point where either life expectancy at birth L increases sufficiently or age
female fertility ends t1 decreases sufficiently that guarding takes over from multiple mating.
Increasing either the pair-bond break-up rate β or the paternity theft rate g increases the
proportion of the landscape that is taken up by multiple mating.
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Figure 5: Contour plots in the Lt1-plane (longevity–age female fertility ends) of equilibrium values of ASR
(numbered contours in red) and dominant strategy (yellow/green regions) as outcomes of numerically integrating
equations (1). Initial fraction of males guarding 0.5, male retirement age t2 = 60, adult male relative mortality
risk k = 1.0, with proportion surviving until maturity s0 = 1/2, mean birth rate ρ = 1/3, carrying capacity
ν = 1/1000, couple-forming rate r = 2, and return rate for females mated with multiple maters σ = 1. Subplots
compare outcomes for different values of pair-bond break-up rate β = 0, 1/16, 1/4 (columns) and paternity theft
rate g = 0, 1/10 (rows). White background indicates extinctions, dark/green indicates guarding dominates,
light/yellow indicates multiple mating dominates. Labelled contours indicate contours of constants ASR. Small
circles indicate approximate locations of chimpanzee and hunter-gatherer life history values at (L, t1) ≈ (15, 45),
(30, 45) respectively.
3.1. Effects of male-specific mortality and retirement
Figure 5 shows landscapes for age of male retirement t2 = 60, male-specific mortality risk k = 1.
Observe that because the male-specific mortality risk k = 1 and age of male infirmity t2 = 60,
along the line with age female fertility ends t1 = 60 we have ASR exactly equal to 1, as we
should expect. We see in this set of landscapes that the contour along which strategy switches
tends to stay very close to contours of constant ASR.
In Figure 6, the age of male infirmity remains 60, but male-specific mortality risk k = 1.2. This
is accompanied by an increase in the approximate ASR at which strategy appears to switch.
While again the switch in strategy does not lie strictly on a contour of constant ASR, it remains
very near—arguably nearer than in Figure 5.
Figure 7 shows the same set of landscapes for t2 = 80 and k = 1. The general features
we observed earlier are largely the same, with the following exception: for g = 0.003, the
contour along which strategy switches deviates markedly from the contours of constant ASR
for low L and low t1, near the extinction boundary. If observed closely, this detail may be
seen in the corresponding row of Figure 5. This, we posit, is an artefact of our life history
model: for sufficiently low L, adult life expectancy may decrease more slowly with L, leading
to comparatively longer adult life expectancies, with the upshot that males can therefore expect
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Figure 6: Results of simulations as in Figure 5, now with male retirement age t2 = 60, adult male relative
mortality risk k = 1.2.
a relatively longer time to compete for the comparatively quickly retiring females, and to gain
paternities when pair-bonded.
Finally, Figure 8 has t2 = 80 and k = 1.2. Because the male-specific mortality risk factor is
higher than in Figure 7, multiple mating gains more traction in this instance; however, because
the age of male infirmity is higher than it is in Figure 6, guarding has more traction than in that
instance. Again, note that the strategy-switch contour lies very close to contours of constant
ASR.
The broad results indicate that in a landscape with varying life expectancy L and age female
fertility ends t1 four things are of note:
1) multiple mating dominates when the average length of time that males can compete de-
creases (either by increasing the male-specific mortality risk k or decreasing the age of male
retirement t2);
2) ASR increases when male retirement is later in life, and when male-specific mortality is
lower;
3) improving the effectiveness of guarding increases the region of the Lt1-plane where guarding
dominates; and
4) the boundary between multiple mating and guarding aligns well, overall, with contours of
constant ASR in the Lt1-plane, indicating that the “signal” of dominant male strategy as a
function of ASR does not depend very much on life history parameters, but does depend on
behavioural parameters such as paternity theft rate and the average length of time a pair
bond lasts.
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Figure 7: Results of simulations as in Figure 5, now with male retirement age t2 = 80, adult male relative
mortality risk k = 1.0.
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Figure 8: Results of simulations as in Figure 5, now with male retirement age t2 = 80, adult male relative
mortality risk k = 1.2.
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Figure 9: Contour plots similar to subplots of Figures 5-8, showing the effect of different initial population
structures when paternity theft is in effect (g = 0.1). Left 9a, initial fraction of adult population multiple-
mating R0 = 0.1; right 9b, initial fraction of adult male multiple-mating R0 = 0.9. Observe that when more
multiple-mating males are initially present (right) the yellow area corresponding to multiple-mating dominating
is larger, close to the contour with ASR ≈ 1.4. Parameters are otherwise as in lower-middle subplot of Figure 8,
with pair-bond break-up rate β = 1/16, male retirement age t2 = 80, adult male relative mortality risk k = 1.2,
with proportion surviving until maturity s0 = 1/2, mean birth rate ρ = 1/3, carrying capacity ν = 1/1000,
couple-forming rate r = 2, and return rate for females mated with multiple maters σ = 1.
Point 1 above indicates that given a fixed effectiveness of guarding, the length of time that
males are able to compete for paternities determines how they are best able to maximise their
average number of paternities. Less time means spreading risk across multiple mates, and more
time means investing in a single mate.
Assuming that all other parameters are constant, it may be possible to shift from multiple
mating to guarding as the dominant male strategy just by increasing life expectancy at birth,
a manoeuvre that simultaneously increases the ASR when t1 < t2. A plausible instance of this
idea would be to draw a path connecting the two circles in the upper-middle plot of Figure 8,
which has pair-bond break-up rate β = 1
16
and paternity theft rate g = 0. One might imagine
that our common ancestor with chimpanzees (as close as can be represented in a model such
as this) lived near the point with L = 15 and t1 = 45, and a “short” evolutionary trajectory
that increased only our life span (as far as this model’s parameters are concerned, i.e. with
no increase in age that female fertility ends) could have tipped us from multiple mating into
guarding male mating strategies.
3.2. A region of bistability
Suppose an initial population contains a mixture of strategies—that is, the populations G(0) +
FG(0) > 0 and M(0) > 0, and the initial fraction of multiple-maters is R0 = M(0)/(M(0) +
G(0) + FG(0)). If g = 0 and no paternity theft occurs we naturally expect the equilibrium
populations to not depend on R0 (which is indeed so). However, if g > 0 is this still the
case? Simulations with different values of R0 and paternity theft rate g > 0 show that indeed
the initial population structure affects the population structure at equilibrium. We illustrate
this in Figure 9, where the initial populations have R0 = 0.1(left) and R0 = 0.9 (right), with
g = 0.1. Juvenile populations are in proportion to the adult male structure, with an adjustment
of (1± g) for guarded (−) and unguarded (−) juvenile populations.
The contour along which the dominant strategy changes when R0 = 0.1 lies approximately
between ASR values of about 1.2 and 1.3, whereas when R0 = 0.9 this contour is very close to
the contour with ASR approximately 1.4. These observations indicate a region of bistability, for
which a future bifurcation analysis could prove interesting; however, for low levels of paternity
theft the region of bistability appears to be small, even if not non-negligible.
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3.3. Sensitivity analysis
We use Latin hypercube sampling to generate 100 000 parameter points within reasonable
ranges. We take age female fertility ends t1 between 40 and 55, age of male retirement t2
between 60 and 80, birth frequency ρ between 1
4cm
and 1
2.5
, and male relative risk k between
1 and 1.2, and excluding cases where the resulting ASR was outside the range of 1
3
to 3. All
other parameter ranges are as specified in Table 2. Results are given shown in Table 4 for
the 78 226 points that satisfy the ASR requirement. The Spearman partial rank correlation
coefficients are ρASR for the change in ASR due to each variable, and similarly ρR for the change
in the fraction R := M/(M +G+ FG) of multiple maters in the fertile adult male population.
We classify a correlation as “very weak”, “weak”, “moderate”, “strong”, or “very strong” if
the absolute value of the correlation coefficient is in the respective ranges [0, 0.2), [0.2, 0.4),
[0.4, 0.6), [0.6, 0.8), or [0.8, 1]. Dominant strategy is determined by R at equilibrium: if R < 0.5
guarding is dominant, and if R > 0.5 multiple-mating is dominant.
Of particular note are the following observations:
1. ASR is most strongly positively correlated with age of male retirement t2 and mean
longevity L (in descending order), as may be expected from the parameter ranges, for
which t2 > t1, so increasing either of these two parameters will result in relatively more
males. Similarly, ASR is most strongly negatively correlated (in decreasing order of
correlation strength) with age of female retirement t1, birth rate ρ, male-specific mortality
risk k, and proportion s0 surviving to mean age of maturity. All other parameters have
a very weak correlation with ASR, |ρASR| < 0.1.
2. Age of female retirement t1 has the strongest correlation with dominant strategy; in
particular, increasing age of female retirement (for the parameter range we’ve chosen,
this means bringing it closer to parity with the age of male retirement) correlates with an
increase in the dominance of multiple-mating. Other life history parameters have much
lower correlation with dominant strategy.
3. Outside the life history parameters, the return rate σ of unreceptive females FM has the
strongest (but only a moderate) correlation with dominant strategy, similar, but opposite
in sign, to pair-bond break-up rate β.
4. Paternity theft rate g is moderately correlated with strategy for the range tested, as is
birth rate ρ. All other parameters have very weak correlations with dominant strategy.
3.4. Discussion
Our sensitivity analysis, in Subsection 3.3, shows that the ASR is controlled largely by the
parameters one would expect: ages t1 and t2 of female and male retirement, and male-specific
mortality risk k, as well as, to some extent, the mean longevity L. Variation in L can in
a certain sense “expose” the difference between t1 and t2; if L is very low, we would expect
individuals to die before having a chance to be removed from the fertile pool due to infirmity
or menopause. The birth rate ρ may affect ASR by causing a population to more quickly
reach its carrying capacity (determined by ν). Since males are removed by death according to
µ(k + νP ), this may result in an extra discrepancy than if they were removed by a different
death law (such as kµ(1 + νP )). Allowing k < 1 may have also consequently resulted in a less
monotonic relationship between birth rate and ASR.
The correlation of birth rate ρ to strategy is unsurprising: a higher birth rate implies more
opportunities for paternity and paternity theft (Hawkes et al., 1995), hence increasing ρ tends
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Table 4: Spearman partial rank correlation coefficients ρASR and ρR for, respectively, ASR and fraction
R = M/(M + G + FG) of males multiple-mating. Due to the number of samples satisfying 1/3 < ASR < 3
(∼ 8 × 104), most p-values were < 0.05. Exceptions (marked with ∗) were paternity theft rate g and ρASR
(p = 0.34201), pair-bond break-up rate β and ρASR (p = 0.18465), and initial proportion of males multiple-
mating R0 = M(0)/(M(0) +G(0) + F
G(0)) and ρASR (p = 0.73475). The implication is that the correlation in
these cases could not be distinguished from no average rank difference due to changes in each of those respective
variables.
Variable ρASR ρR
L 0.315 98 −0.096 241
s0 −0.132 66 0.107 49
δ 0.017 005 −0.022 914
µ −0.083 075 0.025 083
t1 −0.957 66 0.727 61
t2 0.671 68 −0.232 24
ρ −0.420 46 0.466 45
ν 0.010 335 −0.172 44
r −0.008 129 8 0.039 327
g −0.003 397 7∗ 0.5508
β 0.004 743 5∗ 0.461 09
σ 0.009 593 6 −0.5626
k −0.572 52 0.185 27
R0 −0.001 211 5∗ 0.056 362
to increase the frequency of multiple mating as dominant strategy. The likely underlying cause
is the fact that multiple maters can recruit multiple females at once; increasing the average
number of offspring per recruitment is therefore a significant advantage if you do not restrict
yourself to a single female as guarders do.
In chimpanzees, the inter-birth interval is approximately four to five years, but in humans it is
on average less than three—very surprising for a species of our longevity. The Grandmother
Hypothesis posits that grandmothering subsidies for their daughters’ child-rearing shortened
it, and retaining the ancestral age of that female fertility ends. The difference in inter-birth
interval thus suggests in our model that humans should possibly be more likely to multiple-mate
than chimps, but the weakness of the correlation and differences in other parameters tending
towards the success of guarding may be sufficient to compensate. A further difference is that
human longevities are greater, while most male chimpanzees are dead by t1, thus having a much
shorter typical period in which to compete for paternities.
Similarly surprising is the comparative strength of the dependence of dominant strategy on ν.
Although very weakly correlated, the correlation is far from negligible. As 1
ν
corresponds to the
carrying capacity, increasing the carrying capacity (decreasing ν) appears to increase the success
of multiple mating. We posit that this is because although the effect of changing ν on the ASR
is minimal, the dominant strategy is strongly dependent on the number of receptive females
at equilibrium. Consequently, it may be that as ν increases (corresponding to a decrease in
the maximum population size), the number of receptive females decreases, meaning that fewer
receptive females can be recruited by multiple maters, giving guarders an advantage as they
obtain more assured paternities with what mates they can obtain and guard for an extended
length of time.
Results indicated in Table 4 show that female and male retirement ages t1 and t2, birth rate ρ,
and male-specific mortality risk k have non-negligible correlations with both ASR and dominant
strategy. Moreover, each of these parameters has an alternate relationship with each of those
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two quantities: a parameter that correlates with an increase in ASR correlates with a decrease
in multiple-mating as dominant, or vice-versa. Most other parameters correlate to only ASR
or only dominant strategy, else at most weakly to both. The correlation between dominant
strategy and ASR has Spearman partial rank correlation −0.6166, controlling for δ and µ
(child and adult death rates), which are dependent on the choice of longevity L and proportion
s0 surviving at the mean age of maturity. Controlling in addition for t1, t2, ρ and k, the
correlation reduces to −0.2824. That is, there is only a weakly monotonic correlation between
ASR and dominant strategy under variation of all other parameters. This result is consistent
with the observations in Figures 5-8, where the contour along which dominant strategy switches
is largely (but not exactly) aligned with some contour of constant ASR.
What we can understand is that there is no distinct value of ASR at which strategy switches in
the full parameter space. ASR does, however, act as a guide: guarding does not appear to occur
frequently for more balanced ASRs (approximately 1). What we suggest guides the dynamic is
that guarding becomes favourable when the female retirement time scale, 1
τ
, is short enough that
it becomes significant in causing retirements for females in the unreceptive FM pool. A female
recruited by a guarding male will typically produce ρ
β+τ+µ
offspring, compared to ρ
σ+τ+µ
for one
recruited by a multiple mater. Increasing τ (the rate at which females advance to menopause)
not only reduces the average length of time that females spend in either reproducing pool, but
will reduce the number of receptive females for all males to recruit. However, guarding males
who manage to recruit a receptive female are guaranteed a longer time with them to obtain
paternities, but the success of multiple mating depends on both how many receptive females
females and also on how many competitors there are: fewer possible recruitments drastically
reduces the possible number of paternities, and thus guarding is more likely to out-compete
multiple mating.
4. Conclusion
We have developed a model for a primate-like population endowed with sufficient details about
life history and behaviour to begin exploring mathematically the link between the ASR and
the dominant strategy employed by males, and the elements of behaviour and biology that
may affect the outcome to varying extents. We wish to use this model (or subsequent models)
to help explain behavioural differences between ourselves and our nearest living relatives, the
chimpanzees, with the benefit that the model is general enough that the approach employed
herein can be used to understand the mating strategy dynamics of other species as well. Our
model does not assume anything about the details of male-male or male-female interactions—
only their net outcomes as they relate to mean reproduction and mortality rates, though it is
a detail specific to humans to distinguish the age that female fertility ends t1 < t2 the age that
male fertility ends.
Our results indicate that female scarcity relative to the length of the male’s window of oppor-
tunity to reproduce strongly dictates the likelihood that guarding will take hold over multiple
mating, given some understanding of how mate-guarding is accomplished. That is, given an
estimate of the effectiveness of guarding (both in maintaining long term guarded relationships
and in preventing paternity theft) and, in relevant species (such as humans) the lengths of the
reproductive intervals of males and females, the ASR may provide an index by which to predict
the typical mating strategy of males. Particularly, a greater abundance of fertile males relative
to potentially fertile females indicates that a guarding strategy is more likely to be employed
by males.
Though we obtain interesting and possibly useful results through this model, there remain some
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limitations and some questions arise. For instance, direct patrilineal inheritance of strategy is
arguably unrealistic; it would be interesting to understand to what extent a propensity to use
a particular strategy is inherited versus flexible and adaptable to different social and cultural
situations within an individual male’s lifetime. Parallel to that: to what extent does guarding
behaviour really exclude seeking paternities outside the pair bond? Additionally, how does
female choice affect outcomes, and what form does it take? Dawkins’ famous “Battle of the
sexes” game (Dawkins, 1976), re-examined, for instance, in (McNamara et al., 2009), frames
female choice in terms of being “coy” versus “fast”, but the question of strategy depends also
on other aspects of male behaviour: as mentioned in the introduction, male chimpanzees can
be violently coercive with females and dangerous to their offspring, so the latter must make
choices in light of that knowledge to ensure their own safety and the safety of their young.
Finally, what other strategies might males employ that could affect the balance that our model
predicts? It is possible that guarding males also benefit their offspring through provision of
care and protection from infanticide, phenomena we chose not to model here, and even that
the promise of such care (as in the Battle of the sexes) makes a male more attractive as a mate
and thus more likely to obtain (or retain) a mate.
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